Free Will Part II: No need to be disillusioned

Last week I argued that agents making free choices do not in fact have to violate any physical law, in view of quantum indeterminism. Rather than being a ‘slave’ to the quantum statistics, as some philosophers have argued (e.g. Ted Sider, 2005), a choosing agent can be governed by quantum propensities while still having enough … Continue reading Free Will Part II: No need to be disillusioned

Free Will: Why We Should be Skeptical of the Skeptics

It has become quite popular lately to view the notion of free will as a misconception to be ‘debunked.’ To be sure, if we really do not have free will, we should be prepared to face that fact. But is it really a fact? I will argue here that key arguments against robust free will … Continue reading Free Will: Why We Should be Skeptical of the Skeptics